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ABSTRACT
The aim of this research paper is to analyze the role of the spatial factor in the determination of 
audit quality. Concretely, we hypothesize that audit quality is inﬂuenced by location and by the 
existence of spill-over effects generated by two factors: (1) the specialization and reputation of 
auditing ﬁrms and (2) the economic and institutional development of the audit ﬁrm’s location. 
We developed an empirical research to test the existence of such spatial effects (location 
and spill-over) on a representative sample of the Spanish audit market. The study includes 
spatial econometric techniques taking into account the auditee speciﬁc characteristics, as 
well as other external factors. The ﬁndings highlight the relevance of including the spatial 
dimension when the audit quality is being studied. The results conﬁrm the existence of a 
location effect according to the highest quality values are found in the most developed Spanish 
areas. Furthermore, we ﬁnd a spatial spill-over effect among regions, affecting audit quality 
values. This effect conﬁrms that audit quality within a location spreads to its surroundings. 
The results support the promotion of governmental policies leading to improve audit quality 
considering the spill-over effect.
KEYWORDS: audit quality, spatial effects, audit market, regional analysis
JEL Classiﬁcation: C21; O18; M42 
RESUMEN
El objetivo de este artículo es analizar la inﬂuencia del factor geográﬁco en la determinación 
de la calidad de la auditoría. En concreto, la hipótesis que se plantea sostiene que la calidad 
de la auditoría se ve afectada por la ubicación y por la existencia de efectos indirectos 
generados por dos factores: (1) la especialización y la reputación de las ﬁrmas de auditoría 
y (2) el desarrollo económico e institucional de la provincia donde se localiza la ﬁrma de 
auditoría. Con este objetivo hemos desarrollado un estudio empírico para probar la existencia 
de tales efectos espaciales (ubicación y desbordamiento) en una muestra representativa del 
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mercado de auditoría español. El estudio incluye técnicas econométricas espaciales, teniendo 
en cuenta las características especíﬁcas de las empresas auditadas, así como otros factores 
externos. Los resultados destacan la importancia de incluir la dimensión espacial cuando se 
estudia la calidad de la auditoría. Así, se conﬁrma la existencia de un efecto localización que 
identiﬁca que los valores más altos de calidad se encuentran en las zonas de España más 
desarrolladas. Además, nos encontramos con un efecto espacial indirecto entre las distintas 
provincias que también inﬂuye en la calidad de la auditoría, de forma que la calidad que 
alcanza una ﬁrma de auditoría en cierta localización se extiende a las zonas colindantes. 
Los resultados permiten concluir que en la promoción de políticas gubernamentales que 
conduzcan a mejorar la calidad de la auditoría se debe considerar efecto desbordamiento que 
conﬁrma el estudio.
PALABRAS CLAVE: calidad de la auditoría, mercado de auditoría, efectos espaciales, 
análisis regional
Clasiﬁcación JEL: C21; O18; M42 
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INTRODUCTION
Audit reports offer extended information to economic agents (Carcello and Nagy, 2004). An 
audit’s opinion about the quality of accounting information should somehow be reﬂected on 
the decision-making process of economic agents. Because of the importance of these agents’ 
decisions, there is an extensive literature focused on the analysis of audit ﬁrms (Chaney et 
al. 2004). In this context, one of the most analyzed factors regarding the quality of ﬁnancial 
information is the type of auditor. In order to study this characteristic, a wide amount of 
studies (Sainty et al. 2002; Whisenant et al. 2003; Kane and Velury, 2004; Chaney et al. 
2004 or Louis, 2005) consider the size of the audit as a surrogate of the quality. According 
to previous research, the size of an audit ﬁrm affects its reliability and the perceived quality 
of the audit report. Following this reasoning, larger audit ﬁrms are associated with higher 
quality values.
From a supranational perspective, the location of audit ﬁrms may inﬂuence their quality because 
of the differences among legal environments, as can be found in countries ruled by a code-law 
as opposed to countries ruled by a civil-law (Broye and Weill, 2008). Countries with a higher 
legal protection for creditors and stronger disclosure requirements will demand high-quality 
audits as a monitoring mechanism. Additionally, Hope et al. (2008) supported the view that 
the institutional development of each region affects the quality of audit. In this sense, regions 
with less developed institutions will hire smaller audits, associated to lower quality values, 
instead of large ones. Moreover, Huang and Li (2009) consider the “geographical hypothesis” 
to control for the behaviour of auditors regarding industry and geographic patterns, identifying 
a reputation effect that spill over by the location of auditor ﬁrms 
In spite of the apparent importance of the geographical factor on audit quality research 
previous literature in very scarce. In order to ﬁll this gap, we developed an empirical research 
to test the existence of spatial effects (location and spill-over) on a representative sample of 
the Spanish audit market. According to Nieves et al. (2005) the structure of the Spanish audit 
market during the period of 1990 to 2000 is characterized by an oligopolistic conﬁguration, 
in which BIG Audit ﬁrms dominate the market. Furthermore, they reached that since 1995 
there was a consistent increase in concentration. They argued that as the market grows up, 
reaching maturity, the number of auditors reduces and mergers take place among auditors of 
different size, following the same trend as other European countries, which means so the hard 
competition also inﬂuences concentration. Additionally, it should be taken into account that 
there are multinationals established in Spain before the former Spanish auditing law (Ley 
19/1988, de 12 de julio), so they remain with a long tradition within the national market. At 
the moment, almost the whole market of listed ﬁrms (Spanish Stock Market) is audited by 
BIG 4. In addition to the own audit market characteristics, Spain is characterized by regional 
1
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heterogeneity, in terms of institutions and economic activities (Mate et al. 2009). In contrast to 
previous literature, and encouraged by the singularities of the Spanish economy, we contribute 
with new evidence on the relevance of the spatial factor (heterogeneity/location and regional 
spill-over effects) to control for the quality of auditing in Spain. In order to get this objective, 
we undertake an analysis based on spatial econometric techniques considering the province1 
(NUT-3) as spatial unit of reference. 
Our results provide evidence about the relevance of the spatial factors when analysing audit 
quality. In this sense, we obtain that the most institutionally decentralized and developed 
regions present the highest values of audit quality. Besides, these regions tend to be surrounded 
by regions with similar audit quality levels. This study contributes to auditing literature 
because of the results highlights the importance of spill-over effects in the determination of 
audit quality. The results support the introduction of governmental policies leading to improve 
audit quality considering the spatial factor. 
The article is organized as follows: we start with an introduction followed by a second section 
where there is a review of the previous literature. The third section includes the methodological 
framework, the sample and the statistical methods that have been developed. Then, there is a 
discussion about the obtained results, and ﬁnally we present the conclusions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Previous studies on audit quality
There is a large amount of previous literature researching on audit quality. In some cases the 
measure of audit quality remains the main purpose of the study, and in other cases the control 
for the quality of audit is a collateral question.
According to previous studies, the ‘perceived image’ of the audit ﬁrm can be considered as 
subrogate of the audit quality. In this sense, the results of previous research conﬁrm that 
multinational audit ﬁrms beneﬁt from a greater reputation than individual and small and 
medium auditor ﬁrms (Francis and Wilson, 1988; Rollins and Bremser, 1997; Sundgren, 
1998; Sucher et al. 1999 and Ferguson and Stokes, 2002). Therefore, the size of the auditing 
company affects the reliability and perceived quality of the audit report (De Angelo 1981, 
Nair and Rittenberg, 1987; Palmrose, 1988; Cravens et al. 1994; Moizer, 1997; Colbert and 
1 Province is equivalent to the NUT-3 level of aggregation according to EUROSTAT classiﬁcation (2008).
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Murray, 1998; Fargher, et al. 2001; Piot, 2001; Reynolds and Francis, 2001; Sainty et al. 
2002; Whisenant, et al. 2003; Kane and Velury, 2004 and Carcello and Nagy, 2004).
The research developed in North America by Shockley and Holt (1983) tried to address if there 
are differences in the quality of the service between multinationals and other auditors, carrying 
out a survey with risk analysts from large banks. The results of their multidimensional analysis 
led them to conclude that banks differentiate the quality of the audit service. Consequently, 
they only admit a higher quality from multinationals given their high market share in the 
ﬁnancial sector. Next, Nair and Rittenberg (1987) made an experimental study with ﬁnancial 
institutions risk analysts, either from small or large banks. They were asked to analyze the 
different reliability level they obtain from auditors. They introduce as independent variable 
the type of auditor who issues the report, considering multinational ﬁrms and others, with the 
aim of testing whether the reliability of accounting information depends on the reputation of 
the auditor. The results confer more credibility to large auditor ﬁrms than to the small ones. 
Feroz et al. (1991) showed that the size of the auditor is a good subrogate to measure the audit 
quality. They analyzed the disciplinary measures that received the American auditors received 
on the part of the SEC, verifying that small auditors obtained a greater amount of penalties by 
deﬁciencies in the implementation of the audit than the large multinationals.
In the Czech Republic, Sucher et al. (1999) found that auditees perceive a different image from 
multinational auditors associated with a better quality of their audit work. They are seen as 
‘international’ auditors with a branded name, and with a better formalized structure. The sample 
of the study is limited exclusively to public quoted businesses. Khurana and Raman (2004) 
found that the Big 4 auditees ceteris paribus have a lower ex-ante cost of equity capital than 
non-Big 4 auditees. Their ﬁndings supported that Big 4 auditors are perceived as higher quality 
auditors in US, though they did not obtain the same results the UK, Australian and Canadian 
environments. Chaney et al. (2004) researched audit pricing among private ﬁrms of the UK for 
the period 1994-1998. They found client ﬁrms choosing Big 5 auditors faced higher audit fees 
than in the opposite case. In addition, auditees viewed Big 5 auditors as being superior in terms 
of perceived quality on the services provided to a degree high enough to pass a fee premium. 
Louis (2005) developed an empirical study in USA, obtaining that while Big 4 auditing ﬁrms 
are usually assumed to offer better services than the smaller ones. Smaller audit ﬁrms have a 
comparative advantage in serving their customers. Niskanen et al. (2010), found that higher 
quality audits (BIG 4) are used by small private family ﬁrms to overcome agency costs. 
2.2. The spatial hypothesis in audit quality
Previous traditional models to test audit quality do not consider speciﬁcally the “spatial factor” in 
this context. But, according to the geographical hypothesis (Huang and Li, 2009) “audit practices 
of auditors in the same audit organization are highly comparable”. Those authors indicate that 
the geographical hypothesis is related to the research ﬁeld on “local bias of investors”, showing 
RC-SAR  ISSN: 1138-4891  Vol. 15.2  Julio-Diciembre 2012  Pág. 287-310
292 Antonio Luis Duréndez Gómez-Guillamón y Mariluz Maté Sanchez-Val
that the behaviour of asset prices depends on the geographic location. In addition to the location 
factor, Huang and Li (2009) consider the existence of spill-overs due to the reputation effect 
among audited companies, as well as because of the specialization of auditors. In that sense, 
previous studies conﬁrm that audit ﬁrms tend to be specialized in certain sectors of activity, in 
order to reach speciﬁc market niches (Kang et al. 2009). At the same time, there is a tendency to 
concentrate similar productive activities in speciﬁc areas with the intention of earning proﬁt from 
the availability of resources and infrastructures. According to Krugman (1991), the concentration 
will generate a spread-out effect over the surrounding locations. In other words, the existence of an 
intense activity in a particular location will cause the surrounding locations to develop the same 
kind of activity (Ellison and Glaeser, 1999). Following this structure, audit ﬁrms, specialised 
in a certain productive activity, will tend to spread out their activities and skills towards their 
surrounding areas.
A similar reasoning can be followed if we consider the regional development. Concerning 
the relationship between quality and regional development, previous literature establishes 
that countries (regions) with developed economies will have a higher proportion of audit 
assignments conducted by large and international audit companies and, therefore, higher 
quality values. In that sense, Guedhami et al. (2009) supported the proposal that more 
developed regions beneﬁt from more developed institutions and their capital markets require 
more accounting disclosure than in the opposite case. Taking into account this argument and 
the spill-over effect related to the regional development (Ciccone, 2002; Brauninger and 
Niehbuhr, 2005, Mur et al. 2009), a concentration effect is expected regarding the quality of 
the audit ﬁrms. 
Following previous arguments, we propose the next hypothesis related to the geographical 
location of auditors:
H
1
: The audit quality is inﬂuenced by the geographical location and the existence of spill-
over effects.
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
3.1. Data 
Regarding the information collected for the research, we got the data from the “Sistema de 
Análisis de Balances Ibéricos (SABI)” database, provided by Bureau Van Dijk. This database 
comprises of 1,320,000 Spanish ﬁrms. We selected a subsample composed by audited ﬁrms 
which suppose a 26% of the total population (Table 1). These companies are distributed 
throughout the ﬁfty Spanish provinces over the period of 2004-2006.
3
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TABLE 1. AUDITED COMPANIES PER PROVINCE (%)
Province (%) Province (%)
Álava
Albacete
Alicante
Almería
Asturias
Ávila
Badajoz
Baleares
Barcelona
Burgos
Cáceres
Cádiz
Cantabria
Castellón
Ciudad Real
Córdoba
Cuenca
Gerona
Granada
Guadalajara
Guipúzcoa
Huelva
Huesca
Jaén
La Coruña
Las Palmas
30.560
17.995
25.863
17.729
26.127
12.887
17.780
15.413
29.626
25.734
14.021
20.470
21.022
37.078
17.045
21.693
15.152
22.719
16.413
28.909
25.446
23.551
21.121
21.339
29.336
24.540
León
Lérida
Logroño
Lugo
Madrid
Málaga
Murcia
Navarra
Orense
Palencia
Pontevedra
Salamanca
Segovia
Sevilla
Soria
Tenerife
Tarragona
Teruel
Toledo
Valencia
Valladolid
Vizcaya
Zamora
Zaragoza
TOTAL
20.203
22.119
27.018
22.186
29.595
16.282
29.393
33.152
23.077
23.208
27.742
18.630
20.629
25.718
20.488
23.137
23.526
15.385
24.619
26.813
22.324
26.424
17.961
31.237
26.755
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Audit Quality
Previous literature has been focused on the identiﬁcation of the variables that affect the quality 
of audit companies. These variables can be classiﬁed in two groups: (1) variables related to the 
speciﬁc characteristics of audited ﬁrms and (2) variables associated with audit ﬁrms and with 
external factors. Concerning the ﬁrst group, the literature introduces size, economic activity, 
legal form and age of audited ﬁrms (Rob and Fishman, 2005; Guedhami and Pittman, 2006, 
Broye and Weil, 2008; Hope et al. 2008; Benh et al. 2008). Regarding variables associated with 
audit ﬁrms, two of the most analyzed variables were tenure (Lennox, 2000; Francis, 2004) and 
the opinion issued in the audit report (Bartov et al. 2001; Wang et al. 2008). In relation to the 
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external factors, recent studies (Broye and Weill, 2008; Hope et al. 2008 and Huang and Li, 
2009) have highlighted the importance of a spatial component (location and contagion among 
ﬁrms) which could exert an important role in the determination of the quality of audit ﬁrms. 
We used the following typology to classify auditors: “Big 4” multinational ﬁrms, small and 
medium ﬁrms and individual auditors. This typology turns into a proxy of the audit quality 
variable. This is consistent with previous studies carried out by Piot (2001), Francis (2004), 
Mansi et al. (2004) and Hope et al. (2008). According to Francis (2004) there are “differences” 
in audit quality that can be reached comparing the different typologies of auditors. The 
‘perceived image’ of an audit ﬁrm can be considered as a surrogate of audit quality, because 
e.g. Big 4 are viewed as being superior in terms of perceived quality of the audit service 
they provide. This will be the reasoning supporting higher fees from multinational audit ﬁrms 
(Chaney et al. 2004). 
In this sense, the results of previous research literature conﬁrm that multinational auditors 
beneﬁt from a better reputation than small and medium ﬁrms (Ferguson and Stokes, 2002). 
Therefore, the size of audit companies affects the reliability and perceived quality of audit 
reports (Kane and Velury, 2004; Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Khurana and Raman, 2004; Chaney 
et al. 2004; Louis, 2005).
3.2.2. Independent variables: speciﬁc characteristics of auditee
Size
In relation to size (SIZE) of the audited ﬁrm, we will expect larger ﬁrms to demand the highest 
quality auditors, because they have a better reputation and resources to accomplish audit 
work. According to Broye and Weill (2008) and Hope et al. (2008) variables related to ﬁrm 
size are associated on audit complexity, speciﬁcally the amount of resources auditors must 
use to develop their work. Guedhami et al. (2009) hypothesized that larger, growing, more 
proﬁtable companies with more complex operations and less leverage are more likely to hire 
a multinational audit company. An example of the relationship between auditee size and type 
of auditor comes from the case of listed companies. Individual or small auditors are not able 
to carry out the audit work of a ﬁrm quoting at the stock market because they would not have 
enough resources (primarily, employees) to accomplish the assignment. This reasoning is in 
accordance with previous studies showing that in countries where more disclosure of ﬁnancial 
information is required, a high-reputation auditor is expected to be chosen (Fargher et al. 
2001). Usually, country regulations demand more or less disclosure of information depending 
on the size of the business, because this is the way to ascertain the importance of the ﬁrm and 
its impact on the economy.
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Status
The proxy for agency costs is the legal form of the business (STATUS). Public limited 
companies are expected to have higher agency costs than private ﬁrms, because they have 
greater monitoring needs and, therefore, would choose high quality auditors (Francis and 
Krishnan, 1999). Public limited companies would maintain less ownership concentration and 
–having higher agency costs– would not be able to mitigate managerial misconduct, as it 
happens in private limited companies (Guedhami and Pittman, 2006). Audit quality is also 
a corporate governance mechanism to achieve high quality of accounting information and to 
reduce asymmetries of information and agency costs between managers, debt holders and 
stockholders (Hope et al. 2008).
Sector
Through this variable, we consider the economic activity of audited ﬁrms (BUILDING, 
INDUSTRY and SERVICES). Prior literature identiﬁes the relationship between the type of 
auditor and the industry afﬁliation of the ﬁrm (Hope et al. 2008; Huang and Li, 2009). Those 
studies indicate that multinational auditors adopt strategies to specialize in certain sectors and 
obtain a market niche.
Age
Previous studies conﬁrmed the relationship between the reputation of a company and its life 
cycle. Corporate reputation is a collection of economic and non-economic attributes associated 
to a ﬁrm, formed through past actions of the company. According to Rob and Fishman (2005) 
the reputation of ﬁrms increases with age (AGE). The longer the market life of ﬁrms, the greater 
the number of potential customers who are aware of the quality tradition of the company. 
Therefore, there is a reputation effect related to the life cycle of the business. Some other 
previous studies use the age of a ﬁrm as a proxy of its reputation and branding (Datta et al. 
1999). In that sense, ﬁrms offer a brand name and reputation to their customers by hiring 
higher quality auditors. 
3.2.3. External variables
Opinion
Large auditors are associated with more qualiﬁed opinions than small auditors (OPINION) 
(Lennox, 2000). We assumed that there is a higher probability of the audited ﬁrm being a 
multinational when the auditee has received a qualiﬁed opinion in the audit report. Previous 
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research supports this argument: according to Bartov et al. (2001) higher quality auditors 
(Big 4) are less willing to accept problematic accounting practices and more likely to report 
errors and irregularities. Wang et al. (2008) –under the “demand argument”– found that small 
auditors have less ability to ﬁnd errors or are reluctant to report errors when they are found. 
TABLE 2. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
Dependent
variable
Label Deﬁnition
Audit quality AUDQUALITY Using the following typology to classify audits “big 4” 
multinational ﬁrms: (value 3), small and medium ﬁrms 
(value 2) and individual audits (value 1) as proxy of the 
audit quality variable.
Firm speciﬁc
characteristics
Label Deﬁnition
Size of the company SIZE* Dummy variable representing the total assets of each 
ﬁrm: value 1 for ﬁrms with assets below 10 million Euros 
(micro and small ﬁrms); value 2 for the remaining cases. 
To elaborate this variable we consider SMEs classiﬁcation 
(OCDE, 2001). It is log-transformed.
Legal form of the company STATUS* Dummy variable which represents the legal form of the 
ﬁrm: value 1 for public limited companies; value 0 for 
private limited companies.
Economic activity SECTOR* Dummy variable for INDUSTRY, BUILDING and 
SERVICES. The reference sector is agriculture.
Age of the ﬁrm AGE* Year of the data minus year when the ﬁrm was established.
External
variables
Label Deﬁnition
Audit’s opinion
OPINION*
For audit reports in each year we deﬁne: 1 for ﬁrms with an 
audit without exceptions and 0 otherwise.
Rotation of audit TENURE
1 for ﬁrms which have changed audit ﬁrm at least once 
during the last three years.
Historical provinces FORHIS
Dummy variable which is equal to one if the province is a 
historical region and zero otherwise.
 Sources: (*) SABI Database. All these variables are aggregated at a provincial level.
Tenure
Big 4 auditors are associated to lower tenure or higher clientele rotation (TENURE). Lower 
tenure increases auditors’ independence, letting higher quality of accounting disclosure 
(Francis, 2004). Large auditors are associated with more qualiﬁed opinions than small 
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auditors, causing the change of auditor on the part of the audited ﬁrm that tries to reduce 
the probability of receiving a qualiﬁed report (Lennox, 2000). According to Vanstraelen’s 
results (2000), ceteris paribus, the longer the audit-client relationship, the less probability 
the auditor issues a qualiﬁed audit report. Moreover, auditors are more willing to provide an 
unclean report in the last years of their assignment.
Historical regions
In Spain, there are historical regions (FORHIS) with their own legal regulations. Particularly, 
the north area of Spain is characterized by the establishment of “Comunidades Forales” 
(Spanish term for Autonomous Regions: País Vasco and Navarra;), as well as “Comunidades 
Históricas” (Spanish term for Historical Regions: País Vasco, Galicia and Cataluña). The 
north regions of Spain have a higher independence both for governmental decisions and 
for regulatory practices. So, there are geographical characteristics to speciﬁcally study if 
the autonomy of regions and speciﬁc legal environments may also affect auditor choice 
and the quality of the audit work. A similar reasoning has already been tested in similar 
circumstances, although in different countries or regions. At a regional level, Wang et al. 
(2008) supported that regions with less developed institutions will hire small auditors 
instead of large ones. 
3.3. Methodology
The determination of the quality of Spanish auditors starts from a basic linear regression 
model (1): 
  i i iy X β υ= +    2(0, )i N Iυ σ≈     [1]
Where, i (with i = 1, ..., N) represents the different spatial units (ﬁfty provinces in this case),
 
iX  is an N×K dimensional matrix of the explanatory variables, iy  is an N-dimensional vector 
of endogenous observations, E is a K-dimensional coefﬁcient vector, and X t is a residual with 
variance V2. Additionally, spatial spill-over in a one-period model is implemented specifying 
an N×N contiguity matrix W. This is a square matrix which deﬁnes spatial linkages of proximity 
among ﬁrms. Its elements ijw  (with i z j) are different from zero if regions i and j are neighbors 
and equal to zero otherwise. There are different criteria to deﬁne the neighborhood relationship 
between i and j, the common border criterion is one of the most used. According to previous 
reasoning, two regions i and j are neighbors if they have a common border. Following this 
criterion, we deﬁne weight matrix W, a ﬁrst-order binary contiguity matrix with ijw  elements 
(with i z j), equal to one if regions i and j have a common border and zero otherwise. The W 
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matrix is then standardized dividing each element by the sum of the elements in the row it 
belongs to. Thus, the resulting Wy
i
 variable is deﬁned as the weighted average of variable y in 
the units surrounding each region i. 
Spill-over effects can be included in model (1) by means of two alternative structures (Anselin, 
2001). Firstly, the Spatial Autoregressive Regression (SLM) model which presents the following 
structure for each region i,
  i i i iy Wy Xρ β υ= + +   with 2(0, )i N Iυ σ≈    [2]
Where, all variables are deﬁned as in (1) and W is the weight matrix. In expression (2), the 
interaction effect is subsumed in the right-hand side of the equation (UWy). The associated 
coefﬁcient (U) is known as the spatial-lag autoregressive coefﬁcient. It measures spatial 
interaction among neighbor regions. A signiﬁcant positive U conﬁrms the existence of positive 
spatial interaction. In other words, regions with high (low) values in variable y tend to be 
surrounded by regions with high (low) values in y. A signiﬁcant negative U indicates negative 
spatial interaction. In this case, regions with high (low) values in y tend to be surrounded by 
regions with low (high) y values. 
Secondly, the Spatial Error Model (SEM) which is deﬁned in (3) 
i i iy X β υ= +   with  i i iWυ λ υ ε= +   and 2(0, )i N Iε σ≈   [3]
Where, O is the spatial autoregressive term measuring interaction in the adjustment process. 
In this case, the spatial effect is subsumed in the residual term. Two paths can be taken 
in order to select the most adequate spatial structure (SLM or SEM model): (i) a priori: 
the interpretation of each model – while a spatial lag is designed to reveal the ‘‘existence 
and strength of spatial interaction”, a spatial error seeks to correct the ‘‘potentially biasing 
inﬂuences of spatial autocorrelation” (Anselin, 2001). (ii) Statistical: a more rigorous method 
is the selection criterion based on the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) in spatial models (Florax and 
Folmer, 1995).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we include the main results obtained in our empirical application. Firstly, we 
show some descriptive statistics of the variables to corroborate the adequacy of our subsequent 
estimation results. Secondly, we compute the graphical distribution of the audit quality variable 
and, ﬁnally, we undertake the estimation of a model to test spatial effects (location and spill-over).
4
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Because of the regional character of our analysis, the empirical model is undertaken at a 
provincial level, in order to achieve a local representative value. For each variable, we compute 
a regional average value, considering all the companies belonging to the same province. In this 
way, the dummy variables of our analysis are transformed into continuous variables.
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 and Table 4 show descriptive statistics and partial correlations of the variables 
respectively. Table 3 includes the maximum and minimum values, the mean and the standard 
deviation for each variable. These values are included within the normal ranges2 and there are 
not atypical values in the variables. 
TABLE 3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE PROVINCIAL AGGREGATION OF THE VARIABLES
Variable label Minimum Maximum Mean
Standard 
Deviation
AUDQUALITY 1.029 1.3200 1.222 0.111
SIZE 15.987 17.025 16.533 0.188
STATUS 0.395 0.875 0.641 0.123
INDUSTRY 0.000 0.700 0.398 0.166
BUILDING 0.000 0.500 0.122 0.084
SERVICES 0.000 0.826 0.461 0.155
AGE 16.250 30.250 23.853 3.182
OPINION 0.363 0.923 0.719 0.108
TENURE 0.100 0.533 0.310 0.099
FORHIS 0 1 0.240 0.193
Table 4 shows statistic correlations between the explicative variables. Correlation values 
present the expected signs. Also, there is not any high value of correlation. This result ensures 
we reach unbiased and efﬁcient estimations because of the absence of multicollinearity in our 
analysis (Greene, 2008).
2 Normal ranges in relation to previous studies which have used these variables (Rob and Fishman, 2005; Guedhami 
and Pittman, 2006; Broye and Weil, 2008; Hope et al. 2008; Benh et al. 2008).
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TABLE 4. PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
SIZE STATUS INDUSTRY BUILDING SERVICES AGE OPINION TENURE FORHIS
SIZE 1.0000 0.0311 0.0454 0.0305 -0.0610 0.0972 0.0576 0.1420 0.3163
STATUS - 1.0000 0.2832 -0.1858 -0.2104 0.4336 0.0049 0.1907 0.2191
INDUSTRY - - 1.0000 -0.3375 -0.8571 0.3176 -0.0324 -0.0988 0.0950
BUILDING - - - 1.0000 -0.1677 -0.4536 0.1659 -0.2102 -0.1853
SERVICES - - - - 1.0000 -0.1015 -0.0032 0.1672 0.0014
AGE - - - - - 1.0000 -0.2868 0.1472 0.3982
OPINION - - - - - - 1.0000 -0.1071 0.0652
TENURE - - - - - - - 1.0000 -0.1588
FORHIS - - - - - - - - 1.0000
4.2. Geographical distribution of audit quality in Spain
Figure 1 represents the Quartile Maps for the geographical distribution of Audit Quality in 
year 20063.
FIGURE 1. QUARTILE MAP FOR AUDIT QUALITY 2006
As we can observe, the geographical distribution of audit quality does not follow a random 
pattern: provinces with the highest audit quality values (the ones with a higher number 
of multinational audit ﬁrms) are located in Northern Spain, while the provinces with the 
lowest values for this variable are located in the South. These results are in accordance with 
3  The quartile maps of Audit Quality for years 2004 and 2005 have a similar distribution of the variable. 
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previous literature which highlights the importance of the location effect on audit quality 
(Hope et al. 2008; Huang and Li, 2009). In this sense, provinces with the highest values are 
associated to the more economically developed and institutionalized provinces (see Figure 
2 and 3).
FIGURE 2. QUARTILE MAP FOR GDP PER CAPITA IN 2006
FIGURE 3. MORE INSTITUTIONALLY DEVELOPED PROVINCES
The above results (Figure 1) indicate the existence of a geographical pattern regarding the 
audit quality variable. Furthermore, reviewing Figure 1, we observe a certain relationship 
among provinces in relation to their audit quality values. In this sense, provinces with high 
audit quality values tend to be surrounding by provinces with high values and otherwise. This 
effect is known as spatial correlation. Nevertheless, the quartile map analysis is a graphical 
“Comunidades históricas” y “Comunidades Forales”
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tool but sensitive to the number of intervals, so, in spite of this preliminary evidence about 
the geographical effects it is necessary to go a step further. With the aim of testing the spatial 
dependence among regions, we compute the “I Moran test” which evaluates this characteristic. 
For each of the years of the study (2004-2006), the “I Moran test” was positive and signiﬁcant. 
Therefore, we conclude about the existence of spatial dependence in the audit quality variable. 
Table 5 shows the results of the test.
TABLE 5. MORAN’S I TEST FOR SPATIAL DEPENDENCE ON THE AUDIT QUALITY VARIABLE
Variable
AUDQUALITY06 AUDQUALITY05 AUDQUALITY04
I Moran Test
0.1542***
(0.000) 
0.1525***
(0.000)
0.1495***
(0.000)
Notes: *** Null hypothesis is rejected at 1%. 
4.3. Multivariate analysis to explain audit quality
The next step in our analysis is to test if spatial factors have some inﬂuence on the quality of 
audit in Spain. Table 6 shows the results of this estimation through linear regression4.
Variables traditionally included in this kind of research have a similar behaviour to previous 
studies. In this sense, the SIZE variable has a signiﬁcant and positive sign. This result is in 
accordance with Chaney et al. (2004); Louis (2005) and Guedhami et al. (2009), who concluded 
that larger audited ﬁrms demand higher quality auditors, since they have a better reputation 
and more resources to complete the audit work. In the case of the legal form adopted by audited 
ﬁrms (STATUS), we also ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant relation. This result implies that audit 
quality is higher for public limited companies than for private limited companies, because of 
public limited companies have less ownership concentration and higher agency costs than 
private limited companies and beneﬁt less from mitigating managerial misconduct (Guedhami 
and Pittman, 2006). In public limited companies, audit quality is a corporate governance 
mechanism to promote a higher quality of accounting information, reducing agency costs 
and asymmetries of information for stockholders (Hope et al. 2008). Considering the activity 
sector, the variable BUILDING does not obtain signiﬁcant values. Nevertheless, in the case of 
the services sector (SERVICES) there is a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient, in accordance 
4 According to the results of Table 4, INDUSTRY variable was dropped from the regression analysis in order to avoid 
multicollinearity bias.
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with previous studies results for the Spanish audit market (Ruiz et al. 2002). The AGE of the 
audited ﬁrm shows a negative relationship with audit quality variable, although its coefﬁcient 
value is very low and it is not signiﬁcant.
TABLE 6. LINEAR REGRESSION FOR AUDIT QUALITY VARIABLE
To estimate an explicative model of audit quality we use OLS regression for which we assume one cross-
section of NT observations. This reads as: 
AUD  ȕ SIZE ȕ STATUS ȕ BUILDING ȕ SERVICES ȕ AGE ȕ OPINION ȕ TENURE ȕ FORHIS1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8α ν= + + + + + + + + +

2(0, )N Iυ σ≈  
Variable Coefﬁcient (E)
CONSTANT
-2.448*
(0.014)
SIZE
0.224***
(0.000)
STATUS
0.326***
(0.003)
BUILDING
0.153
(0.345)
SERVICES
0.142**
(0.007)
AGE
-0.001
(0.771)
OPINION
-0.353***
(0.003)
Variable Coefﬁcient (E)
TENURE
-0.164**
(0.006)
FORHIS
0.058*
(0.062)
Post-Estimation tests:
LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION: 31.001; BREUSCH-PAGAN EST 6.973 (0.539); JARQUE-BERA TEST 0.211 (0.899); 
ROBUST LM TEST [LMLAG 4.610* (0.031)] [LMERROR 0.467 (0.493)].
Notes: *** Null hypothesis is rejected at 1%. ** Null hypothesis is rejected at 5%. * Null hypothesis is rejected at 10%. 
Probability values are between brackets. This model is estimated used Maximum Likelihood. JARQUE – BERA is the non-
normality test for the residuals of the model. BREUSCH - PAGAN is the heteroscedasticity test for the residuals. LMLAG and 
LMERR tests contrast the existence of interaction in the residuals of the model.
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The variable concerning the professional judgment issued by auditors (OPINION) shows a 
negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient. This result involves that the largest auditors (multinationals) 
are associated with a higher number of unclean audit reports than small and medium auditors 
or individual auditors. In other words, when the auditor is a multinational there is a higher 
probability of issuing a report with exceptions. Previous research supports this argument; Lennox 
(2000) found that large auditors are associated with issuing more qualiﬁed opinions than small 
auditors. Bartov et al. (2001) observed that higher quality auditors (Big 4) are less willing to 
accept problematic accounting practices and more likely to report errors and irregularities. Wang 
et al. (2008) conﬁrmed this hypothesis because, under the “demand argument”, small auditors 
have less ability to ﬁnd errors or are reluctant to report errors when they are found. The variable 
regarding the rotation of auditors (TENURE) is negative and signiﬁcant, because multinational 
auditors are associated with higher clientele rotation (Francis, 2004). 
Finally, the variable controlling for more institutionally developed regions (FORHIS), point 
out a positive and signiﬁcant relationship with audit quality, conﬁrming the hypothesis that 
supports the importance of considering the location factor in the analysis of audit quality. In 
this sense, we conclude that provinces with higher institutional development have higher audit 
quality values. 
Post-estimation tests show that there are no problems in terms of heterogeneity (Breush-Pagan 
test) or normality of the data (Jarque-Bera test). Nevertheless, the spatial dependence LM 
tests indicate the existence of a spill-over effect which should be considered in the estimation 
process. Following Folmer and Florax’s (1995) methodology, we obtain that the spill-over 
effects are generated by the audit quality variable itself. In this sense, we ﬁnd that the LM-
LAG test is signiﬁcant while the LM-ERR test is not. Therefore, the most adequate model to 
consider the spread-out effect is Spatial Autoregressive Regression (expression 2). Table 7 
shows these estimation results in which weight matrix W  is deﬁned as a ﬁrst-order binary 
contiguity matrix. 
Explicative variables conﬁrm similar relations and signiﬁcance as in the previous estimation 
showed in Table 6. We also take into account an additionally variable (W*AUD), which shows 
that the spill-over effect is positive and signiﬁcant. Therefore, results identify the inﬂuence of 
this kind of spatial effect in the determination of audit quality. In that respect, provinces with 
a high number of multinational auditors tend to be surrounded by provinces that also have a 
high percentage of large audit ﬁrms. This result conﬁrms our hypothesis about the existence 
of a contagion effect among auditors, which would be generated by the specialization and 
reputation of audit ﬁrms in certain sectors and/ or by the different regional development values 
in different provinces.
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TABLE 7. SPATIAL ESTIMATION FOR THE AUDIT QUALITY (MLE)
To estimate an explicative model of audit quality we use spatial regression for which we assume one 
cross-section of NT observations. This reads as: 
AUD  WAUD ȕ SIZE ȕ STATUS ȕ BUILDING ȕ SERVICES ȕ AGE ȕ OPINION ȕ TENURE ȕ FORHIS1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8α ρ ν= + + + + + + + + + +
 
2(0, )N Iυ σ≈ 
Variable Coefﬁcient
CONSTANT -2.413(**)
(0.005)
W*AUD 0.040(**)
(0.005)
SIZE 0.217(***)
(0.000)
STATUS 0.315(***)
(0.000)
BUILDING 0.160
(0.267)
Variable Coefﬁcient
SERVICES 0.181(***)
(0.002)
AGE -0.000
(0.880)
OPINION -0.351(***)
(0.000)
TENURE -0.173(**)
(0.025)
FORHIS 0.052(*)
(0.064)
LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION: 62.831; JARQUE-BERA TEST: 0.931 (0.627); BREUSCH-PAGAN TEST: 6.126 (0.633). 
LR-TEST: 5.650(*) (0.001)
Notes: *** Null hypothesis is rejected at 1%. ** Null hypothesis is rejected at 5%. * Null hypothesis is rejected at 10%. 
Probability values are between brackets. This model is estimated used Maximum Likelihood. JARQUE – BERA is the non-
normality test for the residuals of the model. BREUSCH- PAGAN is the heteroscedasticity test for the residuals. The LR test 
allows us to select the best speciﬁcation between two nested models.
Regarding the post-estimation analysis, heterogeneity and normality tests conﬁrm the 
correctness of ﬁt for the estimation model. The LR test indicates that the model with the spill-
over effect ﬁts better than the model without the effect.
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CONCLUSIONS
This paper considers the existence of spatial effects (location and spill-over) in the analysis of 
audit quality. We draw on spatial econometric tools in order to deal with the line of research on 
audit quality through the methodology of the regional analysis. Following previous literature, 
we agree that different stages of economic and institutional development in some geographical 
areas make the “location factor” an essential issue in the analysis of audit quality. Likewise to 
previous research studies, we obtain that the quality associated with some type of auditors in 
a concrete location not only depends on the characteristics of that region itself, but also on the 
audit quality values of the surrounding areas. This spread-out effect (that we call “spill-over”) 
would be generated by the reputation and specialization of audit ﬁrms attempting to capture 
market niches (Kang et al. 2009) and/or by the different development values of each region 
and its inﬂuence on neighboring areas (Krugman, 1991). 
We implement an empirical study considering the Spanish audit market, taking into account 
the regional heterogeneity detected in Spain when economic variables are analyzed. Our 
results conﬁrm the importance of spatial effects when audit quality is studied. In this sense, the 
“location effect” implies that provinces with higher economic and institutional development 
show higher audit quality values. This result is in accordance with previous literature (Hope et 
al. 2008; Wang et al. 2008; Huang and Li, 2009) researching on the importance of geographical 
factor when analyzing the type of auditors. Our results ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant spill-over 
effect that let conclude the audit quality values in Spain for a given province not only depend 
on the characteristics of that province, but are also inﬂuenced by the audit quality levels of 
the surroundings. 
The study contributes to auditing literature because the results highlight the importance of 
spill-over effects in the determination of audit quality. The results support the introduction 
of governmental policies leading to improve audit quality considering the spill-over effect. 
Governmental institutions should be aware of developing policies to promote the audit quality 
in certain “strategic” geographical areas in order to spread out the quality values, skills and 
reputation of some auditors towards the surroundings auditors, due to the contagion effect the 
research reveals. 
REFERENCES
Anselin, L. (2001). Spatial econometrics. Baltagi, B. (Ed.) Companion to Theoretical 
Econometics. Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
5
The geographical factor in the determination of audit quality 307
RC-SAR  ISSN: 1138-4891  Vol. 15.2  Julio-Diciembre 2012  Pág. 287-310
Bartov, E., Gul, F.A., & Tsui, J.S.L. (2001). Discretionary-accruals models and audit 
qualiﬁcations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30, 421 – 452.
Behn, B.K., Choi, J.H., & Kang, T. (2008). Audit quality and the properties of analysts earnings 
forecasts. The Accounting Review, 83 (2), 327-349.
Brauninger, M., & Nieburh, A. (2005). Agglomeration, spatial interaction and convergence in 
the EU. HWWA Discussion paper, 322. Hamburg.
Broye, G., & Weill, L. (2008). Does leverage inﬂuence audit choice? A cross-country analysis. 
Applied Financial Economics, 18 (9), 715-731
Carcello, J.V., & Nagy. A.L. (2004). Client size, audit specialization and fraudulent ﬁnancial 
reporting. Managerial Auditing Journal, 19 (5), 651-668.
Chaney, P.K., Jeter, D.C., & Shivakumar, L. (2004). Self-selection of audits and audit pricing 
in private ﬁrms. The Accounting Review, 79 (1), 51-72.
Ciccone, A. (2002). Agglomeration effects in Europe. European Economic Review, 46 (2), 213-
227.
Colbert, G., & Murray, D. (1998). The association between auditor quality and auditor size: an 
analysis of small CPA ﬁrms. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 13, 135-350.
Cravens, K.S., Flagg, J.C., & Glover, H.D. (1994). A comparison of client characteristics by 
auditor attributes: implications for the auditor selection process. Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 9 (3), 27-36.
Dall’erba, S. (2007). Productivity convergence and spatial dependence among Spanish regions. 
Journal of Geographical System, 7, 207-227.
Datta, S., Iskandar-Datta, M., & Patel, A. (1999). Bank monitoring and the pricing of corporate 
public debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 51, 435-449
De Angelo, L. (1981). Auditor size and auditor quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
1, 113-127.
Doogar, R., & Easley, R. (1998). Concentration without differentiation: a new look at the 
determinants of audit market concentration. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 25, 
235-253.
Ellison, G., & Glaeser, E. (1999). The geographic concentration of industry: does natural 
advantage explain agglomeration? American Economic Review, 89 (2), 311-316.
Fargher, N., Taylor, M.H., & Simon, D.T. (2001). The demand for audit reputation across 
international markets for audit services. The International Journal of Accounting, 36, 407-
433.
Ferguson, A., & Stokes, D. (2002). Brand name audit pricing, industry specialization, and 
leadership premiums post-big 8 and big 6 mergers. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
19 (1), 77-110.
Feroz, E.H., Park, K., & Pastena, V.S. (1991). The ﬁnancial and market effects of the SEC’s 
accounting and auditing enforcement releases. Journal of Accounting Research, 29, 107-
129.
RC-SAR  ISSN: 1138-4891  Vol. 15.2  Julio-Diciembre 2012  Pág. 287-310
308 Antonio Luis Duréndez Gómez-Guillamón y Mariluz Maté Sanchez-Val
Florax, R., & Folmer, H. (1995). Speciﬁcation and estimation of spatial linear regression 
models. Monte Carlo evaluation of the pre-test estimators. Regional science and urban 
economics, 22, 404-432.
Francis, J.R. (2004). What do we know about audit quality. The Bristish Accounting Review, 
36 (4), 345-368.
Francis, J.R., & Krishnan, J. (1999). Accounting accruals and auditor reporting conservatism. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 16 (1), 135-165.
Francis, J.R., & Wilson, E. (1988). Auditor changes a joint test of theories relating to agency 
costs and auditor differentiation. The Accounting Review, 4, 663-682.
Gómez, N., Ruiz, E., De Fuentes, C., & García, M. (2004). Audit quality and the going concern 
decision making process: Spanish evidence. European Accounting Review, 13 (4), 597-
620.
Greene, W. (2008). Econometric Analysis, 5th Ed. Pearson International Edition.
Guedhami, O., & Pittman, J.A. (2006). Ownership concentration in privatized ﬁrms: the role 
of disclosure standards, audit choice, and auditing infrastructure. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 44 (5), 889-929.
Guedhami O., Pittman J.A., & Saffar W. (2009). Auditor choice in privatized ﬁrms: empirical 
evidence on the role of state and foreign owners. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
48 (2), 151-171
Hope, O.K., Kang, T., Thomas, W., & Yoo, Y.K. (2008). Culture and audit choice: a test of the 
secrecy hypothesis. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 27 (5), 357-73.
Huang, R.D., & Li, H. (2009). Does the market dole out collective punishment? an empirical 
analysis of industry, geography, and Arthur Andersen’s reputation. Journal of banking & 
ﬁnance, 33 (7), 1255-1265
Kane, G.D., & Velury, U. (2004). The role of institutional ownership in the market for auditing 
services: an empirical investigation. Journal of Business Research, 57, 976-983.
Kang M.P., Mahoney, J.T, & Tan, D. (2009). Why ﬁrms make unilateral investments speciﬁc to 
other ﬁrms: the case of OEM suppliers. Strategic Management Journal, 30 (2), 117-135.
Khurana, I., & Raman, K. (2004). Litigation risk and the ﬁnancial reporting credibility of Big 4 
versus Non-Big audits: evidence from Anglo-American countries. The Accounting Review, 
79 (2), 473-495.
Krugman, P. (1991). Target zones and exchange rate dynamics. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
106, 669-682.
Lennox, C. (2000). Do companies successfully engage in opinion-shopping? evidence from the 
UK. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29, 321-337.
Louis, H. (2005). Acquirers’ abnormal returns and the non-big 4 audit clientele effect. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 40, 75-99.
The geographical factor in the determination of audit quality 309
RC-SAR  ISSN: 1138-4891  Vol. 15.2  Julio-Diciembre 2012  Pág. 287-310
Mansi, S.A., Maxwell, W.F., & Miller, D.P. (2004). Does audit quality and tenure matter to 
investors? evidence from the bond market. Journal of Accounting Research, 42 (4), 755-
793.
Maté, M.L., García, D., & López, F. (2009). Spatial effects in the productivity convergence of 
Spanish industrial SME’s. Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad, 141, 13-36
Moizer, P. (1997). Auditor reputation: the international empirical evidence. International 
Journal of Auditing, 1 (1), 61-74.
Mur, J., López, F.A., & Angulo A. (2009). Instability and convergence between the European 
regions. Journal of Geographical Systems, 12 (3), 259-280.
Nair, R.D., & Rittenberg, L.E. (1987). Messages perceived from audit, review and compilation 
reports: extension to more diverse groups. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 7 (1), 
15-38.
Carrera, N., Gutiérrez. I., & Carmona, S. (2005). Concentración en el mercado de auditoría 
en España. análisis empírico del período 1990-2000. Revista Española de Financiación y 
Contabilidad, 34 (125), 423-458
Niskanen, M., Karjalainen, J., & Niskanen, J. (2010). The role of auditing in small private 
family ﬁrms: is it about quality and credibility? Family Business Review, 23 (3), 230–45.
Palmrose, Z. (1988). An analysis of auditors litigation and audit service quality. The Accounting 
Review, 63, 55-73.
Piot, C., (2001). Agency costs and audit quality: evidence from France. European Accounting 
Review, 10 (3), 461-499.
Reynolds, J.K., & Francis, J.R. (2001). Does size matter? The inﬂuence of large clients on 
ofﬁce –level auditor reporting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30, 375-
400.
Rob, R., & Fishman, A. (2005). Is bigger better? customer base expansion through word-of-
mouth reputation. Journal of Political Economy, 113 (5), 1146-1162.
Rollins, T.P., & Bremser, W.G. (1997). The Sec’s enforcement actions against auditors: an 
auditor reputation and institutional theory perspective. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 
8, 191-206.
Ruiz, E., Gómez, N., & Guiral, A., (2002). An intersectoral and size comparation of the quality 
of the accounting information through audit reports. Revista Española de Financiación y 
Contabilidad, 112, 545-581.
Sainty, B.J., Taylor, G.K., & Williams, D.D. (2002). Investor dissatisfaction toward audits. 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 17 (2), 111-137.
Shocley, R., & Holt, R. (1983). A behavioral investigation of supplier differentiation in the 
market for audit services. Journal of Accounting Research, 21 (2), 545-564.
Sucher, P., Moizer, P., & Zarova, M. (1999). The images of the Big Six audit ﬁrms in the Czech 
Republic. The European Accounting Review, 8 (3), 499-521.
RC-SAR  ISSN: 1138-4891  Vol. 15.2  Julio-Diciembre 2012  Pág. 287-310
310 Antonio Luis Duréndez Gómez-Guillamón y Mariluz Maté Sanchez-Val
Sundgren, S. (1998). Auditor choices and auditor reporting practices: evidence from Finnish 
small ﬁrms. The European Accounting Review, 7 (3), 443-465.
Vanstraelen, A. (2000). Impact of renewable long-term audit mandates on audit quality. 
European Accounting Review, 9, 419-442
Wang, Q., Wong, T.J., & Xia, L. (2008). State ownership, the institutional environment, and 
audit choice: evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 46 (1), 112-134.
Whisenant, S., Sankaraguruswamy, S., & Raghunandan, K. (2003). Evidence on the joint 
determination of audit and non-audit fees. Journal of Accounting Research, 41 (4), 721-
744.
